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Abstract: 
The paper explores a coherent perspective for understanding the multifaceted puzzle of 
China‘s financial development. Specifically, it tests competing finance-growth nexus 
hypotheses using Granger causality tests in a VECM framework for China over the period 
1980–2002. The empirical results support a complex set of bidirectional causality between 
the financial development proxies and economic growth variables. Additionally, 
bidirectional causality shows the Chinese financial system to be more driven by and closely 
aligned with real sector activities than exposed to speculative finance. Study findings have 
several policy implications. Notably, the development of financial institutions should not be 
emphasized unilaterally. Rather, attention should be given to the complementary and 
coordinated development of financial reforms and changes in other areas. 
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1. Introduction 
A wide body of empirical evidence supports the argument that a well-developed 
financial system has a positive impact on economic performance by enhancing 
intermediation efficiency through reduced information, transaction, and monitoring costs. 
Thus, efficient financial intermediation influences the allocation of resources and 
productivity growth. Additionally, financial development may enhance economic growth 
via either capital accumulation or technological changes. The above link suggests that 
economic growth rarely (if ever) occurs without a well-functioning financial system (see 
McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; King & Levine, 1993; Levine et al., 2000; Beck et al., 2000). 
In other words, if the financial system distorts the allocation of funds and financial 
repression is in place, then financial depth (as defined by Shaw, 1973) will remain deficient 
and economic growth will not be sustained.  
It follows, then, that in terms of causality, efficient and sound (nonrepressive) 
financial development leads to economic growth. Yet, despite its theoretical validity, such a 
view seems inconsistent with recent experience. Specifically, the rapid growth of many 
Asian economies in the 1970s and 1980s was accomplished despite domestic financial 
sectors that could not be regarded as developed (Shan et al., 2001), an observation that also 
holds for China (see Lardy, 1998). With a real GDP growth averaged at 9.4 percent, China‘s 
economic performance is extremely difficult to reconcile with the widespread view that its 
repressive financial system (in the McKinnon-Shaw sense) grossly distorts the optimal 
allocation of loanable funds and is therefore inefficient. Moreover, China‘s huge savings rate 
flies in the face of the conventional wisdom that financial repression artificially creates excess 
in the demand for credit while discouraging saving. 
Whereas the finance-led growth hypothesis is not ruled out in recent studies on the 
finance-growth link in China (e.g,. Shan & Jianhong, 2006), the literature throws no light on 
how a repressive and inefficient financial system can successfully generate economic 
growth. Yet out of this hypothesis emerge three highly relevant questions: How can the 
apparent paradox be interpreted in light of the finance-growth nexus? Is financial 
development a prerequisite to economic growth in China or the reverse? Why and how did 
China‘s supposedly inefficient financial system accommodate such rapid economic growth? 
Given the importance of China in the world economy, and especially the potential 
implications for the literature on competing financial development strategies, the objectives 
of this paper are twofold. First, this paper sheds light on the causality in this case by 
empirically examining the interactions between Chinese financial development and 
economic growth. Second, the paper attempts to theoretically reconcile the apparent 
finance-growth puzzle in China by developing some ideas that can provide intuition as to 
the channel though which financial development and economic growth interact in the 
Chinese context. The positive correlation between financial development and economic 
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growth is already a stylized fact verified in many studies. However, extant findings on the 
causal relations and the contribution of the financial sector to (future) economic growth are 
divergent.  
In general, theoretical and empirical studies suggest three types of causal direction 
between finance and growth. First, in light of China‘s high savings rate (averaging 38 
percent of GDP over the period 1980–93 compared with national investment levels of 37 
percent of GDP), the Harrod-Domar growth model
1
 would lead to a hypothesis of one-way 
causality from financial development to economic growth. Any empirical evidence for this 
hypothesis would imply that China‘s financial intermediation efficiently allocates resources 
and sustains higher economic growth. Second, because China‘s recently begun financial 
reform followed at least 15 years of strong economic growth resulting from reforms in other 
areas like the trade sector and state-owned enterprises (Shan, 2003), there should be 
evidence of unidirectional causality from growth to finance. Such a finding would confirm 
Shan et al.‘s (2001) conclusion that economic growth causes China‘s financial development. 
Nonetheless, a third alternative, the coevolution (bidirectional causality) between economic 
growth and financial development hypothesized in both early and recent literature (Gurley 
& Shaw 1960, 1967; Bencivenga & Smith, 1998), cannot be ruled out. 
 Empirical determination of the relevant causal direction usually resorts to the 
standard Granger noncausality test (1969); however, results from these tests are highly 
sensitive to the order of lags in the autoregressive process. That is, choosing an inadequate 
lag length leads to inconsistent model estimates, and any inferences are likely to be 
misleading. Moreover, from an economic viewpoint, there is no compelling theoretical 
support for the lag lengths for all variables in all equations being symmetric.  
To address the above concern, this present analysis resorts to Hsiao‘s (1981) version 
of the Granger noncausality tests, which uses a cointegration and error correction 
framework. By avoiding arbitrary lag length selection, as well as the use of symmetric lags 
in conventional VAR models, Hsiao‘s approach ensures more reliable results than  those in 
many previous studies on the finance-growth nexus. To the best of our knowledge, no 
finance-growth nexus study addressing Granger causality shortfalls exists at present. 
Therefore, in this sense, this paper represents an advance in the current debate. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews selected 
theoretical and empirical literature, after which Section 3 discusses methodological 
considerations and the data. Section 4 empirically tests the competing hypotheses of 
whether finance causes growth or growth causes finance in China. Section 5 discusses the 
relevance of the findings, and Section 6 draws out the policy implications for China‘s 
financial development strategy. 
                                                 
1 This model assumes that the growth of output in the current year is proportional to the 
investment ratio (the share of investment in output) in the previous year. 
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2. Literature on economic growth and financial intermediation  
A general consensus exists among economists that a well-functioning financial sector 
spurs economic growth (Schumpeter, 1911; Levine, 1997). Major theoretical literature on 
financial development and economic growth processes postulate four distinguishable, but 
not mutually exclusive, effects of financial activity and development on overall economic 
performance: The first is the provision of an inexpensive and reliable means of payment; the 
second, a volume and allocation effect, in which financial activity increases resources that 
can be channeled into investment while improving the allocation of resources devoted to 
investment. The third is a risk management effect by which the financial system helps to 
diversify liquidity risks; thereby enabling the financing of riskier but more productive 
investments and innovations (Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990; Bencivenga & Smith, 1991). 
The fourth is an informational effect, according to which ex ante information about possible 
investment and capital are made available; ameliorating—although not necessarily 
eliminating—the effects of asymmetric information (Levine, 2004).  
From an aggregate production function point of view, each of these financial 
functions may contribute to the transformation of a given amount of savings and investment 
inputs into a larger amount of output through either a capital accumulation channel 
(Hicksian type; Hicks, 1969) or a technological change channel (Schumpeterian type; 
Schumpeter, 1911). Despite Schumpeter‘s (1911) argument that well-functioning financial 
institutions spur technological innovation, early growth models (including the Solow-Swan) 
did not incorporate the role of financial systems because economic growth theorists believed 
technological progress and population growth to be the main driving forces behind 
economic growth and did not see financial systems as directly relevant. Rather, in 
neoclassical exogenous growth theory, financial intermediation was thought to influence 
growth only via saving channels. Thinking changed with the development of endogenous 
growth models in which financial intermediation plays a more specific role through the 
financing of R&D, as well as investment in human capital (see e.g., Barro & Sala-I-Martin, 
1995; Romer, 1986), and the existence of externalities. Such endogenous growth models 
allow finance to function as a cause of technological progress and capital accumulation, 
which can in turn accelerate economic growth.  
Early theoretical considerations on financial system development (Gurley and Shaw, 
1955; Patrick, 1966; and Goldsmith, 1969) show divergent patterns in the link between 
financial sector and growth. For instance, in the two-way relationship between financial 
development and economic growth postulated by Lewis (1955), financial markets develop 
as a consequence of economic growth and then act as a stimulant to real growth. This view 
is supported by Patrick (1966) who hypothesizes two alternatives of finance-growth 
interactions. First, the development of financial markets promotes economic growth (the 
supply leading approach) by reducing market imperfections and frictions. Simultaneously, 
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in a reverse channel from economic growth to financial development, economic growth 
produces an increased demand for financial services, meaning that financial development 
must be understood as a demand driven phenomenon (the demand driven approach).  
Somewhat earlier, Robinson (1952) argued that where enterprise leads, finance 
follows. That is, rising income levels create demands for particular types of financial 
arrangements from households and business sectors, and the financial system responds 
automatically to these demands. Additionally, Goldsmith (1969) maintains that the process 
of growth has feedback effects on financial markets by creating incentives for further 
financial development. The two-way relationship between financial development and 
economic growth is supported by a number of endogenous growth models (Greenwood & 
Jovanovic, 1990; Berthelemy & Varoudakis, 1997; Greenwood & Bruce, 1997).  
Also receiving considerable empirical support in contemporary studies is the positive 
association between financial systems and economic growth in which the level of financial 
development is a good predictor of economic growth (see especially, King & Levine, 1993; 
Rousseau & Wachtel, 1998). Most of these studies conclude that higher levels of financial 
development are significantly and robustly correlated with faster current and future rates of 
economic growth, physical capital accumulation, and economic technological change (see 
Bencivenga & Smith, 1991; Bencivenga et al., 1995; Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990, among 
others). However, Demetriades and Hussein (1996), De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995), and 
Odedokun (1996) moderate this claim by emphasizing that such effects differ across 
countries, time periods, and/or stages of development. Moreover, Gregorio and Guidotti 
(1995) specify that the mechanism of financial development on economic growth is due to 
its impact on ―efficiency‖ rather than the ―volume‖ of investment. 
Beyond the evidence that the level of financial development is a good predictor of 
future rates of economic growth (Levine, 1997; King & Levine, 1993), Patrick's (1966) 
problem—that is, which is the cause and which the effect—remains unsolved (McKinnon, 
1988). Is finance a leading sector in economic development, or does it simply follow growth 
in real output generated elsewhere?  
Unfortunately, there is no simple procedure to determine which view is empirically 
adequate – not even one that would rule out some views as obviously false (Graff, 2001). 
For instance, Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) find one-way causality between financial 
development and economic growth in the case of five OECD countries during an earlier 
period of fast industrialization (1871-1929), while a panel data analysis by Beck et al. 
(2000) shows that banks have a strong causal effect on economic growth. In contrast, King 
and Levine (1993b) conclude that the initial level of financial development predicts future 
growth rate. However, using time series analysis, Arestis and Demetriades (1997) conclude 
that the evidence favors a bidirectional relationship between financial development and 
economic growth. Moreover, Murende and Eng (1994), Demetriades and Hussein (1996), 
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and Luintel and Khan (1999) find evidence of bidirectional causality between financial 
development and economic growth in all their sample countries.  
The above theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that economic growth occurs 
within a well-functioning financial system (see McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). In other 
words, if the financial system distorts the allocation of funds and financial repression is in 
place, then financial depth (as defined by Shaw, 1973) will remain deficient and economic 
growth will not be sustained. It follows that removing the government intervention and 
leaving price mechanism to the market are the key preconditions of economic growth.  
The Shaw-McKinnon argument rests on the view that markets allocate resources best 
and that state development management agencies are not better at plotting development 
paths. The argument ignores some of the structural features commonly found in developing 
economies. For instance, asymmetric information and externalities in financial markets 
(Stiglitz & Weiss, 1992) can lead to sub-optimal levels of financing and investment, an 
inefficient allocation of capital, or have other undesirable consequences such as illiquidity 
which are detrimental for economic growth. Some of these market imperfections may be 
best addressed through appropriate oversight by the government. The degree of government 
involvement in regulating and otherwise influencing the financial system determine the 
degree to which the latter will make a positive contribution to growth (Lawrence, 2003). In 
this regard, analyzing the case of China, Cull and Xu (2000) found that the link between 
bank finance and subsequent productivity suggest that banks were somehow able to identify 
and lend to relatively productive state owned enterprises. 
On the issue of causality between finance and economic growth there have been 
some disturbing empirical results. For instance, an earlier study by Aziz and Duenwald 
(2002) concludes that the positive link between finance and growth in China is more 
apparent than real in that the nonstate sector, which contributed most of China‘s remarkable 
growth, did not resort to the domestic financial system in any substantial way for financing. 
Even more disturbing results are provided by Boyreau-Debray‘s (2003) study on Chinese 
financial intermediation and growth, which finds that credit extended by the banking sector 
at the state level has a negative impact on provincial economic growth. In the same vein, De 
Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) find evidence for a negative relationship between financial 
development and growth in 12 Latin American countries during the period from 1950 to 
1985.  
Overall, empirical studies on Chinese finance-growth dynamics are not only limited 
in number but have produced no consensual interpretation of efficiency at a macroeconomic 
level. Such studies usually measure financial system efficiency in terms of allocative 
efficiency, meaning it can be judged either directly by monitoring some proxy of allocative 
efficiency or indirectly by estimating the contribution of a financial variable to economic 
growth. Allocative efficiency can also be inferred indirectly by studying whether a bank's 
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resources are allocated to the most productive uses or not. Most productive use, in turn, can 
be defined in terms of the macroeconomic rate of return proxied by GDP growth rate. Thus, 
the causal chain between economic growth and financial development in China remains 
ambiguous and, together with the debate on China‘s macrofinancial efficiency, merits an 
alternative investigation using a nonstandard methodological approach.  
3. Model, Methodological Considerations, and Data 
The section presents the empirical framework and discusses the unit root and 
cointegration test procedures, causality tests, and datasets. 
3.1. Standard Empirical Framework 
Drawing from Pagano (1993) and Bailliu (2000), the relationship between capital 
flows and growth can be examined using a simple endogenous-growth AK model. The 
potential effects of changes in financial variables (i.e., financial development) on 
steady-state growth through their influence on capital accumulation, in a closed-economy, is 
given by: 
tt AKY         (1) 
where output is a linear function of the aggregate capital stock. This type of production 
function can be seen as a reduced form for either a framework in which the economy is 
competitive with external economies, as in Romer (1989), or one in which Kt is assumed to 
be a composite of physical and human capital, as in Lucas (1988), where the two types of 
capital are reproducible with identical technologies. There is no population growth in this 
model and the economy produces only one good, which can be consumed or invested. By 
assuming that the capital stock depreciates, gross investment equals: 
ttt KKI )1(1         (2) 
 
Financial intermediation consists in the process of transforming savings into investment. 
The transaction cost involved )1(  can be seen as the spread between lending and 
borrowing rates charged by banks. Capital market equilibrium requires that available 
savings (gross savings minus transaction costs) be equal to gross investment. Thus, 
equilibrium in the capital market ensures that 
tt IS          (3) 
Using equations (1) through (3) and dropping the time indices, the growth rate of output, g, 
can be written as follows  
 





 sA
Y
I
Ag       (4) 
where s denotes the gross savings rate. Equation (4) thus represents the steady-state growth 
rate of the model with financial intermediation and reveals two main channels through 
which financial development can affect economic growth. Financial development is 
assumed to occur as a result of increased financial intermediation, although it could also be 
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influenced by other factors—such as financial innovation or government policies. The first 
channel involves the efficiency with which savings are allocated to investment. As banks 
engage in increased intermediation, they are likely to become more efficient at what they do, 
and thus the spread between their lending and borrowing rates falls. This result in an 
increase in the proportion of savings channeled to investments; thus, g in equation (4) will 
increase as a result of an increase in . Second, an increase in financial intermediation can 
affect growth if it improves the allocation of capital; which in this model is translated into 
higher growth, because it increases the overall productivity of capital, A.  
Based on the above, we now set out a simple model to test the hypothesis that financial 
development is linked to economic growth. The simplest relevant growth model is the AK 
production function in which aggregate output is a linear function of the aggregate physical 
capital stock. Hence, the finance-growth relationship can be represented as commonly found 
in the literature (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 2001): 
tttt ZXY    (5) 
where Yt is the growth of per capita GDP for some time period, t; Xt indicates a set of 
measures of financial sector development; and Zt represents a conditioning variable. 
Achieving the study goal requires a three-phase process: an analysis of the integration order 
of the variables; a test for cointegration among time series; and implementation of Hsiao‘s 
version (1981) of the Granger noncausality method (Granger, 1969) to estimate causality for 
each equation of the model.  
 
3.2. Unit root and cointegration testing procedure 
Nonstationary time series Yt is said to be integrated of order d, [Yt ~ I(d)], if it 
achieves stationarity after being differenced d times (Granger, 1986; Engle & Granger, 
1987). To determine the order of integration, the most common unit root test is the 
Dickey-Fuller (DF) or augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF; Dickey & Fuller, 1979, 1981), 
which estimates the following equation: 
titi
i
tt vydtcycy  




1
211    (6) 
In (6), {yt} is the relevant time series, is a first-difference operator, t is a linear trend, and 
t is the error term. The above equation can also be estimated without including a trend term 
(by deleting the term c2 t). The null hypothesis of the existence of a unit root is H0: = 0. 
Once the time series is ascertained to be integrated of the same order, for example, I(1), 
it should be examined for cointegration. Cointegration regressions measure the long-term 
relationships between the variables whose existence guarantees that the variables 
demonstrate no inherent tendency to drift apart. We use the Johansen cointegration tests 
(Johansen 1988; Johansen & Juselius, 1990), which set up the nonstationary time series as a 
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vector autoregression (VAR) of order p: 



 
1
1
1
p
i
ttititt xyyy BΓΠ                                      (7) 
 
 

p
i
p
ij
ji AIA
1 1
.     , ΓΠ                                         (8) 
where yt is a k-vector of the I(1) variables, xt is a vector of the deterministic variables, and 
t  is an identically and independently distributed error term. The rank of the coefficient 
matrix, Π , is reduced if r < k, where r is the number of cointegrating relations. In this case, 
there exists k×r matrices βα  and  , each with rank r such that βαΠ   and tyβ  is 
stationary. The matrix β is the matrix of cointegrating parameters, and the matrix α  is the 
matrix of weights with which each cointegrating vector enters the k equations of the VAR. 
 Johansen and Juselius (1990) provide two different statistics to test the hypothesized 
existence of r cointegrating vectors: the trace test statistic and the maximum eigenvalue test 
(Johansen, 1988; Johansen & Juselius, 1990). The trace test statistic tests the null hypothesis 
that the number of distinct cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to r against a general 
alternative. Alternatively, the likelihood ratio (LR) statistic, known as the maximum 
eigenvalue test statistic, tests the null hypothesis that the number of cointegrating vectors is 
r against the alternative of r+1 cointegrating vectors. Thus, cointegration is a necessary step 
in determining the most appropriate specification for the causality test.  
3.3. Causality test procedure 
According to Granger (1969), if the inclusion of past (lagged) values of X significantly 
contributes to the explanation of Y in a regression of Y on its own past values and all other 
relevant information, then X is said to Granger cause Y. To examine the nature of the 
causality between the Y and X series, an appropriate Granger causality test requires 
determination of an equal lag length VAR involving Y and X. An inadequate choice of the 
lag length would produce inconsistent model estimates, and any inferences would probably 
be misleading. The importance of lag length determination is demonstrated by Braun and 
Mittnik (1993), who show that estimates of a VAR whose lag length differs from the true 
lag length are inconsistent. Lutkepohl (1993) also demonstrates that overfitting (selecting a 
higher order lag length than the true lag length) causes an increase in the VAR mean square 
forecast errors, whereas underfitting the lag length often generates autocorrelated errors.  
Like most VAR models, the Granger noncausality tests are estimated using symmetric 
lags (i.e., the same lag length is used for all variables in all equations of the model); 
however, as previously mentioned, economic theory provides no compelling reason that lag 
lengths must be symmetric. Thus, in response to concerns about arbitrary lag determination 
and symmetric lags, Hsaio (1981) suggests estimating VARs in which the lag length on each 
variable in each equation can differ. Hsiao‘s approach also combines the Granger concept of 
causality and Akaike‘s final prediction error criterion (Akaike, 1969), and is specifically 
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designed to avoid the imposition of false or spurious restrictions on the model. For a 
detailed discussion of Hsiao's version of the Granger causality method, see Hsiao (1981, 
1982), Cheng and Lai (1997), and Bajo-Montavez (2002). 
Hsiao‘s variant of the Granger causality test can best be illustrated by a practical 
example. Assuming that the two stationary variables Yt and Xt must be tested for Granger 
causality, we consider two models  
ti-t
1
t u  YY  

m
i
i     (9) 
t j -t 
1
 i-t 
1
t  vXYY  

n
j
j
m
i
i     (10) 
where α is a constant term, β and γ are coefficients of exogenous variables, and ut and vt are 
white noise error terms with the usual statistical properties. Hsiao‘s procedure then involves 
the following steps:  
(i) Yt is assumed to be a univariate autoregressive process as in (9), and its final 
prediction error criterion (FPE) is computed with the order of lags i varying from 1 to m. 
The lag m that that yields the smallest FPE is selected, and its corresponding FPE is denoted 
as FPEY (m, 0).   
The corresponding FPE is given by 
T
SSE
x
mT
mT
mFPE
1
)1(
)(


     (11) 
where T denotes the number of observations in the regression, and SSE is the sum of 
squared residuals. Causality can then be determined as follows. 
(ii) Yt is treated as a controlled variable with m lags, then the lags of Xt are added to (9) 
as in (10), and the FPEs are computed with the order of lags j varying from 1 to n. The lag n 
that yields the smallest FPE is selected, and its corresponding FPE is denoted as FPEX(m, 
n).  
The corresponding FPE is given by 
 
T
nmSSE
x
nmT
nmT
nmFPE
)*,(
1*
)1*(
)*,(


    (12) 
(iii) FPEY (m, 0) is then compared with FPEY (m, n). If FPEY (m,0) > FPEY (m, n), then Xt 
is said to Granger-cause Yt, whereas if FPEY (m, 0) < FPEY (m, n), then Yt is not 
Granger-caused by Xt.  
Reverse causality (whether Yt Granger causes Xt) is determined by repeating steps (i) to (iii) 
with Xt as the dependent variable.  
In practice, the implicit assumption that Yt and Xt are stationary must be confirmed 
before (9) and (11) can be implemented. If the series are nonstationary with unit roots, they 
must be transformed into stationary ones by means of a difference filter. If the variables are 
all integrated of the same order—for example, I(1)—a check should be run for cointegration. 
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Such cointegration would imply that any standard Granger causal inferences will be invalid 
unless an error correction mechanism (ECM) is included.  
Engle and Granger (1987) demonstrate that once a number of variables (e.g., Y and X) 
are found to be cointegrated, there always exists a corresponding error correction 
representation, which implies that changes in the dependent variable are a function of the 
level of disequilibrium in the cointegration relationship (captured by the error correction 
term) as well as of changes in other explanatory variable(s). A consequence of ECM is that 
either Yt or Xt or both must be caused by the value of the previous period error term 
derived from the cointegrating equation. Intuitively, if Y and X have a common trend, then 
the current change in Y (e.g., the dependent variable) is partly the result of Y moving into 
alignment with the trend value of X (e.g., the independent variable). Through the error 
correction term, the ECM opens up an additional channel (ignored by the standard Granger 
tests) through which Granger causality can emerge. Consequently, (9) and (10) should be 
modified to incorporate an error correction mechanism, derived as follows from the 
residuals of the appropriate cointegration relationship: 
t1i-t
1
t u  YY  

 t
m
i
i z       (13) 
t1-t j -t 
1
 i-t 
1
t vz XYY  


n
j
j
m
i
i
    (14) 
where zt-1 is the vector error correction term (Engle & Granger, 1987), which stands for the 
short-term adjustment to long-run equilibrium trends. It should be noted that if Xt and Yt are 
I(1) but not cointegrated, no error correction mechanism binds the two variables and there is 
no one-period lagged error term in (13) and (14).  
The introduction of a control variable, however, demands some modification of the 
VAR equation. Specifically, testing for Granger causality in the trivariate case requires that 
(13) and (14) be amended by the adding of a third variable, W, to give the following model 
t1
1
ki-t
1
t u  YY  



 t
p
k
kt
m
i
i zW         (15) 
t1
1
k j -t 
1
 i-t 
1
t  vXYY  



 t
p
k
kt
n
j
j
m
i
i zW         (16) 
with its corresponding FPE:  
T
pnmSSE
x
pnmT
pnmT
pnmFPE
)*,*,(
1**
)1**(
),*,(


   (17) 
In the trivariate case, the relevant comparison is between FPEΔY(m, 0, p) and FPEΔY(m, 
n, p), where (m, 0, p) and (m, n, p) are the combinations of lags leading to the smallest FPE 
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in each case. If FPEY(m, 0, n) > FPEY(m, n, p), X Granger causes Y conditional on the 
presence of the third variable W.  
3.4. Data and stationarity tests 
The sources for all series data, which cover the period from 1980 to 2002, are the IMF 
publication International Financial Statistics (CD ROM, 2004) and the World Bank‘s 
World Development Indicators (2003). Specifically, the data are taken from three indexes of 
financial development: financial deepening, proxied by liquid liabilities, L, (M3/GDP); the 
credit extended to the private sector by banks (as a percentage of the GDP); and the ratio of 
total credit extended to the entire economy by the banking sector (also as a percentage of the 
GDP).  
The first indicator M (M3/GDP) expresses financial intermediary development and 
measures the liquid liabilities of the financial system (currency plus demand and the interest 
bearing liabilities of the bank and nonbank financial intermediaries) divided by GDP. As 
argued in De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995), monetary aggregates like M3 may be good 
proxies of financial development because they are highly related to both the ability of 
financial systems to provide transaction services and the ability of financial intermediaries 
to channel funds from savers to borrowers. Moreover, because the role of capital markets in 
China, as in other developing economies, is unusually small, authors such as Gelb (1989) 
and King and Levine (1993) use M3.  
Again following King and Levine (1993), the second and third indicators are the ratio 
of credit from banks to the private sector as a share of the nominal GDP and the ratio of total 
credit from banks to the economy as a share of the nominal GDP. The former, PC, measures 
the value of credits from financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP. It 
excludes credits issued by central and development banks, credit to the public sector, and 
cross claims of one group of intermediaries on another. The latter, C, combines the credit 
provided by banks to both the public and private sectors. Because the ratio of bank credit to 
GDP is directly linked to investment and economic growth, the credit provided to the 
economy is assumed to generate increases in investment and productivity.  
Nonetheless, De Gregorio (1996) argues that even though the credit/GDP indicator is a 
good indicator of financial development occurring through the banking system, it may be a 
weak indicator of financial development taking place outside the banking system—for 
example, in the stock markets (De Gregorio & Guidotti, 1995) or through informal or self 
financing. However, this weakness may be less relevant in countries such as China, in which 
most financial development occurs within the banking system. Moreover, since total credit 
was largely dominated by directed lending (80 percent), the indicator could also be 
interpreted as a proxy for financial restraint policies.  
As regards the use of the ratio of total credit to GDP as a proxy for macrofinancial 
efficiency, it should be noted that in a strict macroeconomic sense, an efficient financial 
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system should be able to channel a greater volume of funds towards productive investment, 
thereby boosting economic growth. Thus, the focus should be on macroeconomic allocative 
efficiency. In other words, credit to the economy can also be interpreted as a measure (albeit 
an imperfect one) of macro efficiency. 
Following Levine (1997), economic growth is proxied by the logarithm of Y, the 
annual series of per capita GDP growth. Also commonly added into this type of study are 
variables for controlling the possible effects of other growth-determining factors like 
measure of openness to trade and external financing variables (Levine, 1997). Therefore, 
our model includes FDI flows to control for the external factors associated with the 
magnitude of GDP growth fluctuations in China. Foreign direct investment (F) measures the 
net inflow of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of the 
voting stock) in an enterprise operating in China. It is the sum of equity capital, 
reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the 
balance of payments. All variables in the dataset are transformed into natural logarithms so 
they can be interpreted in growth terms once the first difference is taken.  
4. Estimation results 
This section outlines the results from the stationarity tests and Hsiao‘s version of the 
Granger causality test, respectively. 
4.1. Results from the stationarity and cointegration tests 
Before the cointegration tests can be performed, it must be established that the 
variables are integrated processes of the same order. Therefore, all five variables, lnG, lnM, 
lnC, lnCP and lnF, are subjected to the Dickey-Fuller and augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
(Dickey and Fuller; 1979, 1981). The ADF regression and null hypothesis of a single unit 
root cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level for any variable, and each of the five series 
becomes I(0) after first differencing. Table 1 shows the results at the 5 percent level for lnCT, 
lnM, and lnF; and at the 10 percent level for lnG and lnPC.  
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Table 1: Unit Root Test Results 
 LEVEL DIFFERENCE 
 Without time trend 
 DF ADF DF ADF 
G -1.12 -1.45 -1.75** -2.78* 
C 0.69 0.35 -4.06* -4.01* 
M 0.14 -0.25 -4.54** -3.82** 
PC 0.157 -0.461 -4.46** -4.43** 
F -0.2 0.26 -2.29* -2.48* 
 With time trend 
G -4.18* -4.23 -3.60* -3.18** 
C -2.20 -1.91 -4.24* -3.98* 
M -2.41 -2.80 -4.43* -4.32* 
PC -2.66 -2.54 -4.54** -4.30* 
F -2.09 -1.94 -2.88** -2.77** 
Note: (*) and (**) indicate respectively the level of significance at 5% and10%. 
We test for the number of cointegrating vectors using one specification based on the 
assumption that the series have a linear deterministic trend and the cointegrating equations 
have intercepts. We determine the required lag length using the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC), which selects the number of lags required in the cointegration test. After a VAR 
model is first fitted to the data, the AIC gives lag 2 as the appropriate lag structure for 
G-M-F cointegration, PC-G-F cointegration, and G-M-F cointegration. We also test for the 
couples G-F, PC-F, M-F, and C-F using bivariate cointegration.  
The max() and the trace statistic (Johansen, 1988; Johansen & Juselius, 1990) for this 
model are presented in Tables 2 (a-g). The null hypothesis of the absence of a cointegrating 
relation between the endogenous variables is rejected at the 95 percent confidence level for 
both statistics. However, the null of the existence of only one cointegrating vector cannot be 
rejected at the 90 percent level for either statistic. The presence of cointegration between the 
financial development and economic growth variables confirms the existence of a long-term 
relationship among the variables and is consistent with the theoretical predictions of 
finance-growth theories.  
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TABLE 2(a): Johansen Cointegration Test Results for GDP, Money and FDI (G-M-F) 
Maximal Eigenvalue Test Trace Test 
Null 
H0 
Alternative 
H1 
max  
Critical 
Value 
(95%) 
Null 
H0 
Alternative 
H1 
max  
Critical 
Value 
(95%) 
r=0 r=1 34.68 25.82 r=0 r>1 62.83 42.91 
r=1 r=2 16.17 19.38 r 1 r>2 28.14 25.87 
r=2 r=3 11.97 12.51 r 2 r>3 11.97 12.51 
 
TABLE 2(b): Johansen Cointegration Test Results for Private Credit, GDP and FDI (PC-G-F) 
Maximal Eigenvalue Test Trace Test 
Null 
H0 
Alternative 
H1 
max  
Critical 
Value 
(95%) 
Null 
H0 
Alternative 
H1 
max  
Critical 
Value 
(95%) 
r=0 r=1 30.54 25.82 r=0 r>1 49.51 42.91 
r=1 r=2 14.77 19.96 r 1 r>2 18.96 25.87 
r=2 r=3 7.33 12.51 r 2 r>3 4.18 12.51 
 
TABLE 2(c): Johansen Cointegration Test Results for Total Credit, GDP and FDI (C-G-F) 
Maximal Eigenvalue Test Trace Test 
Null 
H0 
Alternative 
H1 
max  
Critical 
Value 
(95%) 
Null 
H0 
Alternative 
H1 
max  
Critical 
Value 
(95%) 
r=0 r=1 29.13 24.25 r=0 r>1 46.86 35.01 
r=1 r=2 16.90 17.14 r 1 r>2 17.72 18.39 
r=2 r=3 0.75 3.84 r 2 r>3 0.75 3.84 
 
TABLE 2(d): Johansen Cointegration Test Results for GDP and FDI (G-F) 
Maximal Eigenvalue Test Trace Test 
Null 
H0 
Alternative 
H1 
max  
Critical 
Value 
(95%) 
Null 
H0 
Alternative 
H1 
max  
Critical 
Value 
(95%) 
r=0 r=1 17.99 11.22 r=0 r>1 20.06 12.32 
r=1 r=2 2.07 4.12 r 1 r>2 2.07 4.12 
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TABLE 2(e): Johansen Cointegration Test Results for Private Credit and FDI (PC-F) 
Maximal Eigenvalue Test Trace Test 
Null 
H0 
Alternative 
H1 
max  
Critical 
Value 
(95%) 
Null 
H0 
Alternative 
H1 
max  
Critical 
Value 
(95%) 
r=0 r=1 12.08 11.22 r=0 r>1 14.37 12.32 
r=1 r=2 2.28 4.12 r 1 r>2 2.28 34.12 
 
TABLE 2(f): Johansen Cointegration Test Results for Money and FDI (M-F) 
Maximal Eigenvalue Test Trace Test 
Null 
H0 
Alternative 
H1 
max  
Critical 
Value 
(95%) 
Null 
H0 
Alternative 
H1 
max  
Critical 
Value 
(95%) 
r=0 r=1 13.63 11.22 r=0 r>1 16.52 12.32 
r=1 r=2 2.89 4.12 r 1 r>2 2.89 4.12 
 
TABLE 2(g): Johansen Cointegration Test Results for Total Credit and FDI (C-F) 
Maximal Eigenvalue Test Trace Test 
Null 
H0 
Alternative 
H1 
max  
Critical 
Value 
(95%) 
Null 
H0 
Alternative 
H1 
max  
Critical 
Value 
(95%) 
r=0 r=1 13.32 11.22 r=0 r>1 16.26 12.32 
r=1 r=2 2.94 4.12 r 1 r>2 2.12 4.12 
 
We thus estimate the ECM under the assumption of only one cointegrating equation 
(CE). Because all signs of the estimates of the CE parameters are as expected, signaling the 
presence of a cointegrating relationship in each set of variables, we can proceed with the 
causality analysis using equations (15) and (16) to capture information on a long-term 
relationship between the level variables. 
4. 2. Results from Hsiao’s version of Granger causality 
As explained in Section 3.3, the Hsiao version of the Granger noncausality test allows 
each variable to enter the VAR with its own lag length. We determine individual series‘ lag 
length using Akaike‘s FPE criterion. Table 3 reports the minimum FPEs for the three 
univariate autoregressions with G at lag 3; C , M, and CP at lag 1; and F at lag 2.  
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Table 3. Final Prediction Error (FPE) of One-Dimensional AR Processes 
Order of Lags FPE of lnG FPE of lnC FPE of LnM lnCP FPE of LnF 
0 0.20960 0.0796 0.1153 0.0511 2.2490 
1 0.00087 0.0055* 0.0034* 0.0045* 0.0823 
2 0.00074 0.0065 0.0037 0.0051 0.0683* 
3 0.00058* 0.0066 0.0035 0.0052 0.0689 
(*) indicates lag order selected by FPE criterion at 5% level 
Taking into account the cointegration evidence, causality is established by comparing 
the minimum FPE derived from a bivariate (equation 15) and trivariate VAR (equation 16). 
The results of Hsiao‘s variation of the Granger test are presented in Table 4 with the error 
correction term under the null hypothesis of noncausality. As the table shows, in the growth 
equation, the FDI (F) is added as the first manipulated variable (step 1), after which C is 
added to the previous equation (step 2). Since the FPE obtained in the first step is smaller 
than that obtained in the second step, the hypothesis that total credit (C) does not Granger 
cause economic growth (G) can be rejected.  
A similar procedure is implemented for total credit equation, private credit equation, 
and money equation, respectively. The results, outlined in Table 4 and presented graphically 
in Figure 1, can be summarized as follows: unidirectional causality is identified running 
from growth to money and from growth to private sector credit; however, bidirectional 
causality is found between economic growth and total credit. Similar conclusions are drawn 
for the error correction terms (ECT), which the results show to be negative and statistically 
significant at either the 1 percent or 5 percent level in all instances but the G-lnPC equation. 
The estimated coefficients range from –0.287 (for the G-C equation) to –0.847 (for the 
PC-G equation), indicating immediate convergence to long-run equilibrium after a shock. 
The regressions fit reasonably well and generally pass the diagnostic tests against serial 
correlation of the first and fourth order, heteroskedasticity, and structural stability.  
The results shown in Table 4 are further confirmed by the joint F-statistics, which 
reveal that the coefficients in each of the trivariate equations are significant at either the 5 
percent or 10 percent level. Our results largely corroborates those by Shan and Jianhong 
(2006), which not only finds bidirectional causality between financial development and 
economic growth but also concludes that the Granger causality from economic growth to 
financial development is stronger than that from finance to economic growth.  
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Table 4. Results of the Hsiao causality tests 
 Controlle
d variable 
First 
manipulated 
variable 
Second 
manipulated 
variable 
FPE F- 
statistics 
 
ECM Causality 
Inferences 
 
Growth (G) 
 
G (3) lnF (1)  0.00051    
G (3) F (2) C (1) 0.00050 6.489 -0.287** C causes G 
G (3) F (1) M (1) 0.00024 11.562 -0.361* M causes G 
G (3) F (2) PC(1) 0.00054 4.035 -0.0032 PC not cause G  
Credit (C) C (1) F(1)  0.00552    
C (1) F(1) G(2) 0.00364 6.332 -0.6156*
* 
G causes C 
Private 
credit (PC) 
PC(1) F(1)  0.00503    
PC(1) F(1) G(3) 0.00278 5.729 -0.847* G causes PC 
M3(M) 
 
M3(1) F(1)  0.0029    
M3(1) F(1) G(2) 0.0021 2.145 -0.8234* G causes M3 
Note: (*) and (**) denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The critical values are 
taken from the t distribution. Numbers in parentheses represent optimal lag lengths.  
  
Figure 1. Causal Relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic growth 
 
 
Liquid liabilities 
 
Total credit 
 
Private credit 
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5. Discussions 
The considerable evidence we find for bidirectional causality does not exclude the 
assumption dominant in the finance-growth nexus literature that finance leads economic 
growth. Both total credit and liquid liabilities predict economic growth in China while credit 
to private sector does not. However, the reverse causality from economic growth to private 
sector credit, which indicates that credit to private sector follows economic growth as a 
result of increased demand for financial services, does support Patrick‘s demand-following 
hypothesis. One possible interpretation of this evidence is that credit rationing is prevalent 
among Chinese private firms, which rely extensively on self-fundraising to meet their 
financing requirements.  
Concisely, our results provide evidence for two-way causality between liquid 
liabilities and economic growth on the one hand and aggregate credit and economic growth 
on the other. Such bidirectional causality could mean that China‘s economic growth plays a 
key role by determining both the demand and supply sides of liquid liabilities and aggregate 
credit. Additionally, bidirectional causality between liquid liabilities and economic growth 
may suggest that the growth in total credit in China after 1978 played both a leading and 
accommodative role in economic growth. That is, by mobilizing savings generated by rising 
income, the banking sector in China succeeded in playing the critical role of recycler of 
financial resources, thereby further fueling economic growth.  
Thus, endorsement of bidirectional causality would ensure the coherence and 
consistency of the Chinese finance-growth nexus and would add weight to the suggestion 
that the financial policies in China may not be as repressive as once thought. The results 
also support the idea that China‘s financial repression policies could rather be seen as 
financial restraint policies (see Hellmann et al, 1997) required for economic growth in the 
presence of asymmetric information and market failures. Thus, it appears that although the 
financial system has appeared inefficient at the microeconomic level, its contribution to 
growth via TFP may have been effective.  
Despite the implications of significant levels of bad loan of Chinese financial 
institutions, it should be noted that a relatively large proportion of lending was for long-term 
fixed assets. In the traditional system, with only a few minor exceptions, banks did not lend 
for fixed investment. Long-term lending is inevitably more risky than short-term lending 
(Naughton, 1998). Bad loan was the unavoidable cost and a development option opted by 
Chinese authorities. From this reason, in the past, Chinese banks were bailed out by the 
government after accumulating large amount of bad loans, which means that for state owned 
banks bad loan ultimately remains a public budget matter. 
Considering the role of FDI (controlled variable in our VAR model) in the growth 
process of China, it can be argued that not only does the FDI trickledown effect depend on 
the extent the financial sector‘s development, but higher productivity is only possible when 
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the host country has a minimum threshold stock of human capital (Alfaro et al., 2004). 
Human capital in turn is supported directly via formal education, on the job training and job 
creation (particularly in rural and remote areas) as part of the overall development goals, 
which, until 1995, banks paid considerable attention to in determining the allocation of bank 
credit (OECD‘s Economic Survey of China, 2005). Hence, it can be argued that the forms of 
government involvement in regulating and otherwise influencing the financial system in 
China has determined the degree to which the latter made a positive contribution to growth. 
To imply that the Chinese financial system is inefficient one needs to prove that 
economic growth in china has been achieved without the theoretical contribution of 
financial sector, which would suggest that finance doesn‘t matter in the growth process or 
that the finance-led-growth proposition does not apply in the case of China. Such a 
proposition would be harder to explain in light of basic facts on china‘s financial evolution 
in the last 30 years and in regard to a number of empirical studies suggest that productivity 
improvement accounts for a significant proportion of China‘s spectacular growth (e.g., 
World Bank, 1997; Maddison, 1998; Wang & Yao, 2003; Jeanneney & Liang, 2000). 
Alternatively, one has to prove that China‘s repressed financial system did not 
negatively affect its growth process. Therefore, shedding light on the puzzle requires the 
exploration of reasons other than those commonly evoked in the literature. For example, one 
possible avenue may well be spillovers created by ‗financial inversion‘ in which a bad state 
bank loan can result in positive externalities in other sectors. Accordingly, in China, a 
state-owned bank‘s ability to fund projects which may yield low returns in the short-run 
may well coincide with high returns in the long run as external economies are generated. 
Thus the reasons for state intervention as well as the performance of the financial systems 
can be seen as macroeconomically efficient within the context of China‘s growth process. 
So far it can be argued that despite its inherent weaknesses. Therefore, the overall 
macroeconomic performance of the Chinese economy has been efficiently nurtured by its 
financial system‘s influence on allocation of resources and productivity growth. 
Two limitations worth noting should be kept in mind when interpreting our results. 
First, the smallness of our sample size and the preponderance of theoretical reasoning on the 
efficiency issue, conclusions must be stated hesitantly and with ample qualifications. 
Second, sufficiently detailed measures of financial development are not available in China. 
For instance, appropriate datasets of informal financial transactions in China have not been 
included in the present study although the extent of informal financial markets in China 
suggests they have played a significant role in the growth process and therefore should be 
included in finance-growth nexus study of this kind.  
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6. Policy implications and conclusions 
This paper aimed at providing a coherent perspective for understanding the 
multifaceted puzzle of China‘s financial development. To this end, the analysis empirically 
tests competing finance-growth nexus hypotheses using Hsiao‘s version of the Granger 
noncausality test for China over the period 1980–2002. Relevant literature has often asserted 
that financial development contribute directly to economic growth. Our empirical 
investigation also shows that this is likely to be the case in China. Our results also point to 
the existence of reverse causality running from economic growth to financial development. 
In brief, the major empirical results support a complex set of bidirectional causalities 
between Chinese financial development proxies and economic growth.  
The evidence of bidirectional causality implies the co-evolutionary character of 
financial development and economic growth, which implies that China‘s financial 
intermediation is consistent with the country‘s economic growth requirement and 
developmental goals. Overall, the findings indicate that, at the macroeconomic level, 
China‘s financial development is rather efficient in respect to the country‘s developmental 
goals. That is, the paradox between China‘s impressive economic growth and its inefficient 
financial intermediation is only apparent when the nation is considered in terms of its level 
and pattern of economic development. Our finding that total credit and economic growth 
influence each other could also be interpreted as a denial of the financial repression 
hypothesis in favor of a financial restraint argument. Which also suggests the China‘s 
financial system does not distort the optimal allocation of funds. Such an interpretation does 
not underestimate the urgent need for strengthening the Chinese financial system through 
appropriate policies. 
It is also worth noting that financial development in China has been one of the set of 
factors which made it possible for the high sustained growth to take place. More emphasis 
should be placed on growth-enhancing policies rather than on a big-bang type of financial 
reforms that tends to focus on short-run and sectoral returns. Even though this latter remains 
important, reforms should not proceed at a faster pace than structural changes in the real 
sector or changes taking place in institutional settings. 
The study findings have several policy implications. First, the finding that credit to 
private sector does not contribute in predicting economic growth clearly indicates the need 
for further strengthening private sector and market-reform in China. Chinese banks should 
significantly improve awareness of risk management in order to successfully pass the test 
after their market-oriented reforms. In this regard, it is important to mention that China has 
taken serious steps to strengthen its banking sector by cleaning it up of bad loans ahead of 
deregulation mandated by the World Trade Organization at the end of 2006. It needs to be 
stressed that it is inevitable that significant efforts should be made in the next few years to 
restructure the financial system.  
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Second, with the risk that economic growth in China may be severely overheated 
reverse causality also recommends that in order to slow economic growth, tightening credit 
with tools other than interest rates (such as tight monetary expansion) will be effective in 
China. Moreover, under China‘s rapid economic growth financial system faces a risk 
resulting from overcapacity in a number of industries. Close interaction between finance and 
real sector recommend that in order survive boom-bust cycles, commercial banks should 
learn to reduce their exposure to potential bad loans resulting from excessive lending. Again, 
improving risk management and strengthening regulatory framework should be kept on top 
of reform agenda in China. 
Our conclusions must be taken moderately and with ample qualifications due to the 
small sample size and other limitations inherent shortcomings in finance-growth nexus. 
Chinese financial development is no exception to the long list of unresolved issues in the 
financial development literature. The Chinese case does, however, present a wide range of 
theoretical and empirical challenges; some of which this paper attempts to explain in light of 
its empirical findings.  
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